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Current demographic trends indicate that the process of ageing is more and more 
advanced in Western societies. While the available literature addressing this issue 
concentrates most often on developing effective tools for socio-economic policy, 
this paper aims at exploring the dominating assumptions of economics and culture 
to find how they may influence the demographic process that was mentioned. The 
purpose of the analysis undertaken here is to verify the thesis which claims that 
basic anthropological assumptions present in neoclassical economics and modern 
culture somehow ignore or underestimate such essential aspects of human life as 
old age and the helplessness or weakness connected with it. 
The conclusions of the paper indicate that there is a need for intergenerational 
balance within society, which, e.g., facilitates socio-economic development. Some 
of the most important factors influencing this may or may not be present within 
the economic theory and culture it is based on. It means that without the adequate 
vision of man and the phases of human life, the process of building a mentally 
healthy and vibrant society where everyone has his or her place is hardly possible.  
Keywords:  ageing, pensioners, sociodemographic shifts, cultural context, 
economic thought 
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1. Introduction 
The goal of this article is to analyse the role that economic theory—and, more 
broadly, culture—plays in perceiving social phenomena and making decisions that 
pertain to them. This work focuses on the importance of theoretical assumptions 
regarding human beings—especially old age—for the functioning of socio-
economic order. Undertaking such an analysis seems even more interesting and 
significant if we consider that the issue of ageing communities is becoming more 
and more topical and deserves thorough investigation.  
We are going to analyse, then, to what extent the claims within the dominant 
economic theory—treated here as one element of culture—support the proper 
understanding of ongoing processes and how they influence an effective solving 
of problems that arise along with it.  
In the available literature, the connections between the ageing of society and 
socio-economic policies are the domain of interest of scholars in areas such as 
demographics, economics, or sociology. Therefore, the main perspective I have 
adopted will refer to cultural studies, which provides a broader cognitive frame-
work for reflecting upon the concept of old age and its status in economic theory. 
When going through the growing body of research and analyses on population 
ageing, we should note that by focusing on providing solutions from the field of 
socio-economic policy they deal less often with the question of assumed anthropo-
logical adequacy, i.e., the way they perceive people as subjects of social life. This 
work is an attempt to fill this gap.  
Therefore, I present here a hypothesis that proper understanding and reacting 
to the process of society ageing, also adequately managing it, requires, on the one 
hand, extending or even going beyond the perspective of neoclassical economics 
and the homo oeconomicus model it utilises. On the other hand, it calls for a criti-
cal analysis of cultural claims that facilitate the rise and solidification of the age 
structure that is undesired from the viewpoint of socio-economic development.  
2. Old age as a natural stage of human life and a component 
of social order  
When analysing old age, we should first define how we understand the term, 
which, after all, refers to universal human experience.  
It should be noted that old age in itself is not a problem, because it is an ob-
jective process that is an integral part of human life. However, it is connected with 
certain difficulties—both for the individuals and for society as a whole. And so we 
speak not only of ageing individuals but also of an ageing population (cf. Jurek, 
2012, p. 17). This results in old age becoming—especially in recent years—an 
important challenge for socio-economic policy but also, and in a way because of 
it, a popular research topic (cf. Golinowska, 2008, p. 27). 
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Returning to the definition of old age, we can see it is an uneasy task, which 
is evidenced by the subject literature. Łukasz Jurek (2012, p. 19) writes that so far 
there has been no univocality on the matter of a universally accepted threshold of 
when old age begins. He notes, however, that most scholars assume that the proper 
criterion for qualifying anybody as old is between 60 and 65 years of age.  
A different author writes about three approaches to defining old age. The first 
of them, described as subjective, refers to how an individual evaluates their activi-
ty on the job market and their state of health. The second stance, called the func-
tional approach, uses objective data such as employment status, entitlement to 
social benefits or mental condition. The third approach uses the criterion of age, 
which entitles individuals to a pension or other benefits resulting from the number 
of years they have lived (cf. Zaidi, 2008, p. 28). To complete this list, we should 
consider defining old age as the stage in our lives when our weakness and depend-
ence can be seen much more clearly than in our productive age. In such a defini-
tion we avoid, on the one hand, purely formal or numerical limitations and, on the 
other, the subjectivity of a given individual’s perspective.1 
From among the presented approaches we shall adopt here the last presented 
understanding of what old age is because it presents us with the most objective per-
spective on the topic. At the same time, I do realise that it is not perfect and that 
other approaches can be justified and useful.
2
 
When it comes to understanding old age, we should explain a few matters. 
First, old age is here recognised as a natural stage of human life, which means that 
it is an indispensable consequence of living (although it does not always occur if 
death comes earlier) and thus an inescapable perspective in human existence. As 
such, it should be seen as an important element related to the functioning of the 
socio-economic order. Second, old age—not unlike childhood—clearly presents 
a fundamental characteristic of human relations that cannot be properly described 
in purely economic terms. This is because it shows that in a society there always 
will be a space of asymmetric relations—ones in which there is no equality in the 
contributions or potential of its participants—which are fundamentally different 
from the symmetrical relations of market partners (cf. Morse, 2001, p. 25). Chan-
tal Delsol (2006, p. 142) writes about how the latter outnumber the former in hu-
man life:  
Avoiding the inequality between giver and recipient breaks the relationship be-
tween them. […] Equality is maintained, but at the cost of a broken relationship. 
In the realm of human bonds only genuine friendship implies equality. All other 
relationships are unequal, that is, they entail giving that sometimes goes unrecip-
rocated. 
                                                          
1 In a way this definition of old age is reflected in the social benefits system, where, on the one hand, 
we have pensions granted according to age or number of years in work (which can be understood as 
exhaustion of energy necessary for professional activity), on the other we have disability pensions 
granted in special circumstances to people (regardless of their age) who for some reason suffer from 
weakness or lack of independence.  
2 Jan Szczepański (1980, pp. 228–240) interestingly writes about problems with defining old age. 
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This means, in turn, that economics as a discipline specialising in interactions 
of a symmetrical nature cannot explain the character of a wide range of phenome-
na and practices that are not commercial in character.
3
 The term “non-economic” 
was not used here on purpose so that we do not associate with economics only 
such practices that pertain to the money-goods exchange governed by market 
rules. As a result, we can still see areas associated with, say, running a household, 
where we can recognise many acts of an economic nature since they aim to satisfy 
specific human needs with the available means and material resources.  
It seems, therefore, that by directing our attention to the phenomenon of old 
age—and the accompanying sense of human helplessness—we gain a chance to 
restore a real shape to the subject of socio-economic processes, which, although 
officially called human, apparently lost its human form and attributes. This is what 
we are going to investigate.  
3. Economics and old age—who is the “protagonist” 
of neoclassical economic theory and what is his logic?  
Now, we would like to look at the subject of economic practices and do so in 
a way that economics itself sees them. First of all, we intend to prove that the 
model of human beings most often adopted in economic sciences
4
 lacks funda-
mental characteristics that connect them with the phenomenon of old age. It is 
worth analysing the origin of the “economic man” who—despite being criticised 
in recent years—still seems to be a focal point in economic thought.5 Janusz 
R. Sobczyk (2008, p. 140) writes about the beginning of the concept of homo 
oeconomicus: 
closest to its cradle stood those responsible for this deceitful conceptual juggl-
ing: A. Smith (classical economics), J. Bentham (utilitarianism), J. Mill and 
J.S. Mill; behind their backs was the entire tradition of English philosophy: em-
piricism (F. Bacon), mechanistic ontology (I. Newton), sensualistic epistemolo-
gy (J. Locke), associative psychology (D. Hume) and naturalistic ethics of ego-
ism and hedonism (T. Hobbes). In this way, the newly created concept, an 
intellectual product of a typically British mentality – still in the form of a name-
less idea, or, if you will, a silent assumption, became the matrix of burgher ideas 
on the nature of man, the market and economy. 
                                                          
3 We should mention here the contribution made by, among others, Gary S. Becker, who by applying 
economic tools to behaviour not usually associated with this discipline, to an extent was able to draw 
our attention to matters not very well analysed before, such as the importance of families for the func-
tioning of the economy. 
4 Primarily, it pertains to neoclassical economy, which more or less since the 1970s has dominated 
economic theory and still seems to be its mainstream (cf. Stankiewicz, 1998, pp. 390–391, 416–423). 
5 We should, of course, mention the concept of the “sociological man”, which is a mostly successful 
attempt to elaborate and develop the way we think of human beings. Although it became quite popular 
in sociology, it seems that in economics the dominant way of looking at people is through the lens of 
the “economic man” paradigm (cf. Morawski, 2001, p. 33). 
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The description above seems important insofar that it shows which philo-
sophical concepts, including ethical and anthropological, can be found in the 
“character” of homo oeconomicus. Frank Knight defines the term further (1951, 
p. 282 as cited in Chmielecki, 1999, p. 260):  
economic man is not a “social being”, economic individualism rules out society 
in the properly human meaning of the term. Economic relations are presented 
here as impersonal. Social structure, as seen by the economic theory, is a number 
of Robinsons interacting with each other solely through the market. 
As a matter of fact—as we have observed—the experience of fragility, de-
fencelessness and helplessness is an immanent part (although to a varied extent) of 
human life and it is not limited to just childhood or old age. It means, then, that its 
asymmetrical character should be treated as a basic trait of the human condition. It 
does not mean, however, that only asymmetrical relations should be claimed to be 
truly human.  
In order to present it properly, it is worth showing the issue in the form of 
two logics: of giving and contract. The first one, according to Chantal Delsol 
(2006, pp. 144–145), in a way conditions the creation of society. She writes that: 
every human relationship begins with a need that one is willing to see filled. 
This is not a matter of finding a permanent solution for an abnormal or unjust 
situtaion with the goal of achieving self-sufficiency or „normality”. The first 
condition of a “society” is the acknowledgment of our constitutive insufficiency. 
I cannot build relationships if I do not recognize my won need, conceived not as 
an exceptional circumstane or an injustice awaiting redress, but as a substantial 
quality. This sense fo finiteness is what creates a common world and at the same 
time gives it meaning. 
The quote above might look very serious, but maybe in it we can find an ex-
planation for what is in various works called the erosion of social bonds (cf. 
e.g. Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler & Tipton, 1996, p. XI.), which can be facil-
itated by the proliferation of symmetrical relations and the logic of contract that it 
entails.  
As far as these two logics go, it seems that nowadays the idea that the logic 
of contract is more effective and useful in everyday life seems to be the dominant 
one. In such a perspective we can see an assumption that these two logics are 
somewhat in opposition to each other. In reality, however, they are complemen-
tary elements, not alternatives, in the same way as, e.g., the sphere of family life 
should not be treated as the opposite of the sphere of market exchange. It is well 
understood by Luigino Bruni (2008, p. X), who writes that “[…] contract (self-
interested exchange) and mutual gift are surely two different forms of reciprocity, 
but these are both forms of reciprocity that are essential in a good society.” 
Certainly, the presence of the two logics discussed here means that social in-
teractions cannot be reduced to simply “some providing for others” or just calcula-
tions based on the principles of equivalence. Clearly, choosing one of these paths 
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might seem a simple solution, but in truth, it is a trap. Despite that, it seems that 
historical records abound in examples of such social arrangements. While cases of 
utopian attempts to make everything free are evidently irrational and ineffective, 
the illusion that social order can be based solely on the logic of contract further 
gains supporters. In this perspective, it seems especially appealing to accept the 
argument according to which a relatively simple market mechanism—as a leading 
example of contractual logic—is a sure and the easiest solution of problems within 
society. However, we should remember here about the idea by Rocco Buttiglione 
(2005, p. 349), who writes that “[…] a contract […] is possible only in a situation 
where there exists a relative balance of power.” As a consequence, we can say that 
in a situation of imbalance we first need a gift, thanks to which it will be possible 
to introduce contractual logic. In a similar vein, we can understand the claim by 
George Gilder, who writes that “capitalism starts with giving” (Gilder, 1993, 
p. 21). It can be seen very clearly in the process of human development; before 
people become fully mature and independent members of a society, capable of 
playing various roles in it, including, e.g., professional roles, people have to get 
support. This can come in the form of means for living and growing in the biolog-
ical sense, and competencies and skills in the process of socialisation, among 
others.  
The issues presented above prove that economics is insufficient for explain-
ing how societies work—even the so-called industrial or consumption societies, 
where the economic dimension seems to play a crucial role. This is so because it 
fails to provide adequate anthropology that could grasp human experience in its 
entirety. In this same context, the problem discussed here can be reduced to the 
absence of asymmetrical relations in the economic perspective, because these 
relations are no less important for society; indeed, in many aspects, they should be 
considered more so.  
Returning to the way humans are perceived by the dominant economic theo-
ry, we should say a few words about how they are characterised. A trait that can 
be seen very clearly—which can, of course, be associated with its “model na-
ture”—is their abstract, in a sense, ahumanist character. It is evidenced by their 
asexuality, which means that a dimension as important as sexuality is ignored, 
and with it, various significant tasks and social roles, such as parenthood. Togeth-
er with it also disappear basic relations and generational dependencies, which we 
cannot omit while discussing the question of old age. From it stems a certain 
atemporality of the economic man—he does not belong to any generation, does 
not age, is not engaged in any human relationships, even as basic as being a child 
to their parents. His ahumanist character means that they also cannot change, 
which leads to the conclusion that he is not affected by the passage of time, which 
is connected with the inescapable nature of the processes and changes that pertain 
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We are going to try and show these paradoxes by juxtaposing family and 
market relations as spheres depicting the differences between the two discussed 
earlier logics and the ways of treating other people that are peculiar to each of 
them. It can be seen in Table 1.
6
 
Table 1. Family Relations vs Market Relations 
 Family Market 
The dominant characteristic of the relation Personal Material 
The temporal horizon of the relation Long-term relations Short-term relations 
The relationship of the parties Asymmetrical Symmetrical 
Gratification 




The dominant logic Gift Contract 
The final perspective Personal Individual 
 
Looking at the comparison above, we should ask an apparently trivial ques-
tion of whether economic man, crafted primarily for market relations, can cope on 
his own in old age. It seems obvious that he will not.  
Despite it being so evident, we still do not fully realise it. Even if we witness 
in economics not only discussions and proposals of changes but also specific ideas 
for changing our understanding of how humans manage their lives in society, it 
should be noted that many administrative and legal economic solutions reflect 
a paradigm in which individuals are not unlike Robinson Crusoe in their actions. 
The problem is that nowadays—in the face of demographic shifts—they grow old, 
and hence the question of whether they can cope as well as they have done so far 
is becoming more and more urgent, and we do not even know if we can realistical-
ly expect that to happen.  
4. Cultural status of old age 
In the light of the analyses presented above regarding people seen as subjects of 
socio-economic practices and processes, it is worth asking why this anthropologi-
cal model dominates in our understanding of the world, not only in economic 
terms. Perhaps it could be more useful if it was treated purely as a model. Maybe 
it is so widespread because it was assumed that, firstly, it would always be used 
with the awareness that it is just an anthropological reduction, and secondly, that 
such an inadequate simplification would have no serious ideological consequences 
(cf. Nowak, 2007, pp. 28–29). 
In order to resolve these questions, it seems necessary—and it has already 
been done to a large extent—to analyse the role that economics plays as a theory 
explaining human actions. It has been done so primarily in the economic sphere 
                                                          
6 It is important to remember, however, that the market here is not treated as a synonym for the whole 
economy, which is a much wider domain.  
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but also—for some time now—in other domains, which it has brought its appa-
ratus to (to the irritation of some) (cf. Lompart, 2007). However, in order to fully 
grasp the importance of economic theories, we should begin with a much broader 
perspective of culture. We define it here as an immaterial sphere consisting of 
symbols, values and ideals (cf. Krzysztofek, 1991, p. 17). Like Samuel P. Hun-
tington, we can claim that “[…] we define culture in purely subjective terms as the 
values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations and underlying assumptions prevalent among 
people in a society” (2000, p. XV). 
It turns out that adopting a cultural framework is necessary because econom-
ics is not an autonomous discipline in the sense that it is not independent of the 
currently dominating paradigm in culture. It is worth mentioning a fragment of 
David Throsby’s (2010, p. 22) analysis, where he writes:  
The formal precision of modern economics, with its theoretical abstraction, its 
mathematical analytics and its reliance on disinterested scientific method in test-
ing hypotheses about how economic systems behave, might suggest that eco-
nomics as a discipline does not have a cultural context, that it operates within 
a world that is conditioned by, nor conditional upon, any cultural phenomena. 
But just as the radical critique of contemporary economics has argued that the 
sort of economics described above cannot be value-free, so also can it be sug-
gested that economics as an intellectual endeavour cannot be culture-free. 
I will concentrate on culture, firstly because specific theories, including eco-
nomic ones, reflect in their assumptions cultural claims. Secondly, by referring to 
the anthropology of economic man, we have shown the way reality is perceived 
that currently dominates in culture and is reflected in economics.  
Therefore, I assume that the problems analysed here—with special emphasis 
on the issue of old age—are rooted in culture, which has changed radically in the 
past few decades. In the context we are interested in, we will devote special atten-
tion to aspects of identity related to age and intergenerational relations.  
Analysing current socio-cultural reality, we might get the impression that 
Manuel Castells described as social arrhythmia. It is—especially if contrasted with 
the past—a phenomenon that forces us to think and search for adequate models for 
action. Castells (2007, p. 444; cf. Berger & Luckmann, 2010, pp. 77–79) writes:  
The current organisational, technological and cultural events, characteristic of 
a new, emerging society, heavily undermine this ordered cycle of life, without 
replacing it with any alternative sequence. I suggest a hypothesis that network 
society is characterised by a collapse of rhythms, both biological and social, re-
lated to the concept of the cycle of life. 
A matter discussed by Castells, especially important for the analysis at hand, 
is the collapse of rhythms that pertain to the life of an individual but also affect 
their personal relationships, also in the intergenerational perspective. It means that 
the traditional and natural cycle of life, resulting from objective biological factors, 
is becoming more and more a subject to individual manipulation. It is surely facili- 
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tated by various scientific and technological achievements, which, although 
providing an illusion of control over inescapable physiological processes or hope 
for slowing them down, cannot stop nor reverse them.  
When it comes to the direction of this struggle, the desired effect is clearly to 
prolong or even preserve youth, which in a way is connected with the perennial 
human desire for immortality and perfection. However, a particular characteristic 
of our era is that people have at their disposal a wide range of means for attempt-
ing to realise such aspirations.  
We live in an era that, according to Robert J. Samuelson, is characterised by 
agelessness, which can be defined as abstracting from age or ignoring it. The 
author, quoted by Benjamin R. Barber (2003 as cited in Barber, 2009, pp. 12–13) in 
the book Consumed, states:  
We live in an age when people want to behave their age less and less. The 
younger (or many of them) want to be older, the older (or many of them) want to 
be younger. We have gradually destroyed the traditional stages of the cycle of 
life by shortening childhood, after which come several not very well-defined in-
termediate stages. Youth […] starts before puberty and for some lasts until the 
end of life […] Denying one’s age is a common practice.  
When analysing this issue, Barber refers to the concepts of infantilisation and 
adultisation, which clearly show the consequences of upsetting the cycle of life 
connected with the social arrhythmia mentioned above. On the one hand, these 
terms mean a tendency to treat adults like children, and on the other, to behave 
towards children as if they were already independent and mature. An area where it 
is especially evident is the market, where products and services once reserved for 
specific age categories are addressed to those outside of the target age groups. 
From the economic perspective, it is certainly supposed to result in broadening the 
group of consumers and, as a consequence, increase the market share and profits. 
From a cultural perspective, however, it leads to homogenisation and the disap-
pearance of distinctions fundamental to the functioning of social order. As a result, 
objective—and in a way universal—generational differences and the roles and 
duties they entail are replaced by an individually and purely subjectively shaped 
individual identity. In consequence, age, which to a larger extent used to define 
one’s place in the age structure and specify one’s social role, is more often 
perceived in the current cultural context as a voluntary element that one is free to 
treat according to subjective preferences.  
It is one of the consequences of the power that individualism has been given 
in our contemporary culture. It weakens the connection that an individual has with 
basic groups (such as their family) and other communities, including their socie-
ties. Absolutising the individual dimension is, however, a fake promise and, para-
doxically, as Ulrich Beck writes, the individual “[…] is losing importance and is 
simultaneously given an illusory status of the world’s co-maker” (Beck, 2002, 
p. 205). It means a specific crisis of that which is common, which is an element of 
the world of life and the community of values and ideals connected with it, which 
are elements of culture. As a consequence, the place of a universally perceived, 
28 MICHAŁ A. MICHALSKI  
created and experienced reality is taken by a multitude of alternative worlds, 
whose reality can be contested. It is partially confirmed by the popularity of mass 
media, especially of programs offering access to unreal worlds. Alvin and Heidi 
Toffler (2007, p. 14) wrote:  
[…] To escape—or at least forget—what appears like chaos, millions turn to tel-
evision, where “reality TV” fakes reality. Thousands form “flash mobs” and 
gather to beat one another with pillows. Elsewhere, players of online games pay 
thousands of dollars in real money for nonexistent, virtual swords that their vir-
tual selves can use to win virtual castles or maidens. Irreality spreads. 
So, we are dealing with a culture that in various ways tries to distance itself 
from reality. This leads us to the conclusion that we are facing a widespread and 
powerful cult of youth because youth is what we typically associate with careless-
ness, fun, and indifference to objective conditions and limitations. And these are 
the areas that our contemporary culture likes so much.  
The protagonists of the thus characterised contemporaneity are young, 
healthy, beautiful, intelligent, rich individuals. They are not old, ill, poor or weak. 
This allows us to describe the currently dominating way of perceiving and valuing 
the world as a culture of the strong, which—in the ethical dimension—bears the 
hallmarks of social Darwinism. This problem is presented in an interesting way by 
Edwin Black in his book War Against the Weak (2004). He shows how the events 
of the 20
th
 century, especially the genocide of World War II, are ideologically 
rooted in 19
th
-century eugenics and last in some form in the 21
st
 century, when the 
value of human life becomes a thing of a purely individual decision or a matter 
that the majority can decide on. Black (2004, p. 47) writes: 
Now social planners were rallying around the notion that in the struggle to sur-
vive in a harsh world, many humans were not only less worthy, many were 
actually destined to wither away as a rite of progress. Supporting the weak and 
the needy was, in essence, an unnatural act. 
Our contemporary culture is, in fact, regressive because it takes humans back 
to nature, where strength and adaptability are fundamental regulators. It results in 
making human being a specimen and no longer a person.  
It is well illustrated by the situation of children in general, especially unborn 
children. Buttiglione (2005, p. 349) writes about this in the context of logics 
presented above: 
we clearly see here a model of a subject that is completely devoid of power and, 
therefore, excluded from the contract. The question of legalising abortion—
regardless of its objective moral gravity—is also a touchstone of the anthropolo-
gy and self-awareness of the nation, it is a touchstone of the quality of justice 
that the nation intends to rest their existence on […] The same goes for the old. 
An old person gradually loses strength and thus—according to the concept of 
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conventional justice—loses rights. In the final stage of their lives, they are com-
pletely devoid of strength as well as rights. A sick and disabled person is in 
a similar situation. 
These remarks allow us to claim that the current cultural paradigm affects the 
status of the old in society and the way we perceive old age in general.  
5. Conclusion—what future does an ageing society have? 
In conclusion, we can say that the fate and future of ageing societies will be main-
ly influenced by cultural premises, including, among others, anthropological, 
ethical and those included in economic theories, and to a lesser extent by currently 
possessed material resources.
7
 It means that the theoretical background is crucial. 
It seems especially important in the context of the pragmatic lifestyle which now-
adays is widespread and popular.  
To a large extent, this seems to be the way in which current welfare mecha-
nisms work. They are characterised—despite their obvious differences—by 
a conviction that providing basic means for existence is the key to social order and 
progress. Unfortunately, it is not the case. When it comes to the topic at hand, 
welfare states seem too centralised to address the problem of old age effectively. 
This is because old age is a complex and unpredictable matter to manage within 
a state’s macrostructures, which do not handle non-standard and non-routine cir-
cumstances well.  
Another problem of the welfare state is the influence it has on the status of 
care work—indispensable in the case of children and the elderly—which is be-
coming depreciated. This is because the state, by “taking over”8 the task of 
providing care and social safety, gives the false impression that the natural con-
nection between how families work, performing procreative, socialising or care 
functions, and generating resources for social security has weakened. As a result, 
the general public becomes convinced that taking on family roles and duties, espe-
cially those related to care and upbringing, is not necessary from the perspective 
of how the state and society operate. Because of this and the fact that caring and 
fostering are demanding and, unfortunately, hardly ever paid, they have a low 
cultural status. This, in turn, sends an important message to generations entering 
adulthood and leads to this kind of work not being very popular, which aggravates 
the demographic and economic crisis of many welfare states.  
We are facing a situation where the dominant shape—especially in Western 
civilisation—of culture emphasises individuality and subjective autonomy on the 
one hand, and, on the other, strengthens the passivity of its citizens, who assume 
                                                          
7 An example of this can be the issue of effectiveness of state financial incentives for increasing wom-
en’s fertility rate in various countries.  
8 The quotation marks used here mean that the state does not have “its own” money, but it finances its 
enterprises using resources created by its citizens, who have to a large extent become mature members 
of the society thanks to free care and fostering work done in families.  
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that the state will take care of them in every circumstance, including their old age. 
As far as its condition and competitiveness go, it is becoming clear that the West 
is giving way to other civilisations. An important consequence of this is the ageing 
of the society. Obviously, steps are taken to maintain the socio-economic order, 
but their perspective is rather short-term.  
In such circumstances, some countries have for years now supplied their 
population with immigrants, who, in turn, were able to support the basic “life 
functions” of society. However, such a strategy results in a more or less 
fundamental cultural transformation, which shows more and more clearly how 
barren a culture is that does not respect the fact that for the intergenerational 
contract to work well we need balance between generations, which helps society 
develop and engage and utilise the potential of each generation in the most 
effective and adequate manner.  
An alternative, which is sometimes treated as an inescapable perspective and, 
to some extent, as an attempt to adapt to our current demographic trends, is the 
greying economy. However, it is an idea for a short-term adjustment rather than 
a comprehensive and adequate solution to the growing problem. Of course, we can 
emphasise the necessity to meet the demand for goods and services by the elderly, 
but from the viewpoint of serious long-term social policy, we should ask what 
should be done in the context of a society that is seriously shrinking.  
Therefore, we should consider whether building a greying society—without 
analysing thoroughly the cultural context we mentioned above—would not be just 
an attempt to make the elderly as strong and fit as possible, rather than carefully 
recognising and accepting the uniqueness and meaning of old age in the social 
order. To expect that in the new context all elderly people will be able to adjust to 
new challenges, such as longer professional activity, is far from rational.  
So, it seems justified to say that the greying economy is not the right solution 
to the problem of the rising demand for specific goods and services for the elderly, 
although, due to the ageing of society, such an economic model will, in some way, 
emerge in the short term. The very concept itself cannot offer any appropriate 
remedy because it would need an appropriate social philosophy. Such a system 
would have to be rooted in a culture that would respect the objective characteris-
tics and attributes of human life in the personal dimension, joining and revealing 
as indispensable and mutually complementary the individual and collective as-
pects of human existence. Here, we can recall the words of the economist Jennifer 
Roback Morse (2001, p. 27), who writes:  
societies do much better if they face facts rather than ignore them. In particular, 
political philosophies and their accompanying social philosophies need to ad-
dress the limits of human power. We are all completely incapacitated in infancy, 
and even adults at the height of their capacities are far from omnipotent. If phi-
losophies and the societies built around them ignore either of these truths of hu-
man helplessness, negative consequences will follow. 
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The problems discussed here surely deserve a deeper and more thorough 
analysis, especially because our work shows, to some extent, how multidimen-
sional and complex they are. It seems that further investigation may be necessary 
not only to harmonise our current tensions and the challenges they present us with, 
but also—which seems even more important—to search for such cultural solutions 
that would facilitate the consistent development of societies. It will be possible 
only when certain principles are observed, such as the fundamental rules govern-
ing human life that show the objective importance and meaning of each stage in 
human life both in the individual and intergenerational dimension in the context of 
the entire society. 
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